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1

PRIVATE BOUNDARIES IN MAINE.

I. Definition.

It is the purpose of the writer to deal in this thesis

with only private boundries and not with county, state or in

ternational boundries.
Perhaps the beet definition of a boundry is this:-

*Any separation, natural or artificial, which marks the con
fines or line of two contiguous estates.

The term is applied

to include objects placed or existing at the angles of the

bounding lines, as well as those which extend along the lines

of separation."
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.

II.

Creation.
Having defined what a boundary is, the next step will be

to look at the methods of creating them and the several classes

of boundries.

In general boundries divide themselves into two

classes, Natural and Artificial.

But of whichever class it may

chance to be, its creation is first in importance.
The creation of boundries by deed is, of course, the most
common and will be taken up in a later part of this thesis. Pa
rol and actual location, long acquieseed in,agreement by parol,
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followed, by acquiescance are all of importance.

Whether location of a boundry by parol is sufficient was

the issue in the case of Grove v. Richardson, 4 Maine 327«

The case was an action to recover seisin and possession of
certain land.

It was settled that a dividing line that had long

been fixed and acquiesced in by the parties ought to be upheld

unless it was clearly erroneous.

Weston, Justice, in very apt

words, covered well the situation when he said, "A dividing line,

between owners of adjoining tracts, may be settled by them under

a misapprehension or mistake, which, if clearly shown, may be
corrected, but unless this act of the parties be regarded as
strong evidence of the accuracy of the line thus amicably estab

lished, a fruitful source of litigation will be left open, of
which one or both the parties may avail themselves when under

less friendly feelings."
Grove v. Richardson,

Maine 327*

This principle was upheld and further applied in Moody v.
Nichols, 16 Maine 23.

Later the above principle was made binding in a case coming

up on a writ of entry.

A fence was built on what was agreed to

be the line just after the deed was made.

sidered to be the line for several years.

This fence was con

The court held this

line as agreed upon would be upheld, although not conforming
with the original calls in the deed.

Knowles v. Toothaker, $8 Maine 172.
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III. Construction.

A. In General.

It is settled law in Maine that in the case of a deed
or conveyance which is in some •particulars false, the false part

will be rejected, and the true part

retained if sufficient.

In a certain case the land was described as "beginning at a stak

and stones standing in the north corner of that part of the lot,
which the judgment debtor bought of Harvey Wait," in truth no

part of the lot had been bought of Wait.

That part of the de

scription was rejected and the truth was established and upheld.
Wing v. Burgis, 13 Maine 111.
The intention of the parties as appear from the in
strument will be upheld by the court.

A lot was described as follows:

"Twenty acres of lan

in lot 56 in the 120 acre lot west side of Royal’s

River in Nor

Yarmouth, and bounded as follows; viz., Beginning on the wester}
side of said river, by the river at the dividing line betwixt tb

land owned by Hannah Russell and the grantor in the aforesaid
lot, thence running westerly on said dividing line so far that a

line running southerly parallel with the westerly end line of
said lot, until it comes within six rods of the southerly side

line of said lot, thence easterly, keeping the width of six

rods from said side line to Royal’s river aforesaid, thence by
eaid river to the bounds first mentioned, containing twenty

acres of land."

The court held that although the deed recited

the exact amount of land intended, yet the calls of the deed
were clear and were such that they must be given effect to, and

if.the monuments were established they would hold good.

Dunn v. Hayes, 21 Maine 76.

In the construction of description it is the law that every

call must be answered, if it can be done. "The intention of the

parties is to be sought by looking at the whole, and none is to

be rejected, if all the parts can stand consistently together."
The above quotation is from the opinion of Tenney, J. in

Herrick y.Hopkins, 23 Maine 217•

B. Plans.

Where the description of the land is by reference to a
plan and there is no other description its location and limits
must depend altogether on the plan.

Thomas v. Patten, 13 Maine 329-

A deed contained the following clause, "said premises being

lot numbered fifty-two on the plan of said town of Dennysville,
etc."

The court held that the plan referred to became a part of

the deed a3 much as if incorporated therein.

Lincoln v. Wilder,

29 Maine 169.
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C. Particular Words.
The Maine court has had occasion to rule on the construction

of many particular words.

The writer will endeavor to take up

the more important decisions.

A deed read as follows: "Easterly eighty-four feet on land
of L."

L’s land extended only about half that distance.

Held,

the boundary would be the extension of L’s line in the same di
rection.

Ricker v. Barry, 3^ Maine 116.
The words southwest line means due southwest, and not in a

southwesterly direction.
Robinson v. Miller, 37 Maine 312.

"Beginning at a stake and stones, etc."

This establishes the

governing corner and all distances, directions and calls and

courses, depend on this corner.

Wiswell v. Marston, 5^ Maine 270.
The above case of Wjswell v. Marston also settles the law

that the expression "running on line" means the true line of
division.
The words "to a certain person’s land" do not mean to land

that happens to be occupied by that person, but to such land as

he owns himself.
Jewett v. Hussey, 70 Maine 433•
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Rather a peculiar case arose out of a conveyance that read
in part "said boundary by the upland to be located and fixed by

said R and L."

It was decided that under such a deed R and L

had the power of locating the boundry line subject to the remain
der of the description in the deed.

Haynes v. Jackson, 66 Maine 93.The Maine court defined "crossing the bar" as meaning pass

ing clear across the entire width of the bar on the line of low

water.

Bremen v. Bristol, 66 Maine 35^*

In the case of a boundary on a well established line to
extend to stake and stones, which stake and stones are not in

said line, the line will be considered as a continuing monument
and will govern.
White v, Jones, 67 Maine 20.

The words "south to X’e land"and also northerly and easterly

have been held to mean due south or north as the case may be.
Reed v. Knight, 37 Maine 137.
Foster v. Foss, 77 Maine 279•
D. Uncertainty.

It is clear that the intention of the parties when discovered
governs.

In case of any uncertainty in the description the rule

must obviously be that those parts may be disregarded and the
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intention gathered from the remainder of the description.
Such was the situation and holding in Madden v. Tucker, U6
Maine 3^7.
IV. Evidence.

A. Burden of Proof

The general rule as to the burden of proof is the same as in
all cases being upon-the plaintiff or claimant, but should the

defendant interpose a defense in the nature of a claim of right
the burden may shift to him.
Black v. Grant, $0 Maine

The weight of authority is that the party who sets up a
claim of a certain particular^oundary or monument must intro

duce proof of same.

Also, in case of agreements settling boun

daries between adjoining lands, he must affirmatively prove the

agreement on which the claim is based.
On the first of the above stated rules Maine has ruled and

she agrees with the weight of authority.

Robinson v. White, ^2 Maine 209.

There is, however, no ruling on the second point, but the

writer believes Maine would hold with the weight of authority.

B. Admissibility.
I might state the general rule to be that the same kind of

8

evidence is admissible to establish boundaries as is admissible
in the case of other disputed issues.

• Tradition

evidence of boundary,by the weight of author

ity, was and is admissible to establish ancient boundaries, both

public and private,

This is not the law in our own jurisdiction.

In the

case of public boundaries it is clearly admissible, but not where

private boundaries are in issue.
Chapman v. Twitehell, 37 Maine 59•

Should a private line be proved to coincide with a public

line then it is obvious that tradition evidence would be admis
sible .

Deeds and grants, such as have a tendency to identify and

define the boundary that is in issue, are properly admissible.
Chase v. White, 41 Maine 228.
Parol evidence of the agr°ement of the parties in locating

boundaries after the deed is made, is properly admissible.

Wing v. Burges, 13 Maine 11.
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V• Monuments.
Monuments are of two kinds, natural and artificial.
If in a description of boundries of land, a natural monu

ment is called for, the identification of this monument is to
be made by a fair and reasonable construction and interpretation

of the whole instrument.

Regard must be had, however, for the

true intent of the parties as expressed therein.

Nelson v. Butterfield, 21 Maine 220.
Artificial monuments are monuments or signs erected and

placed by the hand of mankind, as before stated.

The

identifi

cation of an artificial monument is a question for the jury to
be gathered from the instrument and testimony.

"What are boundries of land conveyed by a deed, is a ques
tion of law. Where the boundaries are is a question of fact. An
existing line of an adjoining tract may as well be a monument
as any other object.

And the identity of a monument found

upon the ground with one referred to in the deed, is always a

question for the jury."
Davie, J. in Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Maine 575•
Monuments not located actually at the time of making the

conveyance, but located by agreement immediately thereafter
will control.
Kennebec Purchase v. Tiffany, 1 Maine 219.
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The destruction of boundary monuments has been the subject
of legislation in cur state.

With regard to these our statute

says: "Whoever wilfully and wantonly or maliciously injuries or

removes any monument erected, or tree marked as a boundary of

any land or town; destroys, defaces or alters the marks thereon,
made for the purpose of designating such boundary; etc (dealing

with mile stones, guide-boards, etc.) shall be punished, etc."

Maine, Revised Statutes, Chapter 12S, Sec. 19.

VI. Corner s.

Corners like monuments may be for the court or jury to de

termine.

What is sufficient to constitute a true corner is for

the court to determine, and its

corner
A.
way.

identity is for the jury.

was located as being opposite a point on a high

The court held that the corner was located as a point on

the side of the road where a line drawn at right angles to the
road from the point located, would meet the side of the road.

Bradley v. Wilson, 5^ Maine 357*
In case the corner referred to is a known and ascertained

point or is easily ascertainable upon the ground by a proper

examination, the true location of such corner is the one re

ferred to in the instrument.
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A deed was to "the ’westerly corner of land set off to William
Cobb.",

The corner was ascertainable .

Court would not admit

evidence that a stake was meant, which stood in a different

place.
Pride v, Lunt, 19 Maine 115.

Government corners are conclusive when they can be found Pr

the spot where they were originally established is definitely
established.

It makes not the least difference if the location

was correct or otherwise.
Crogin v. Powell., 122 U. S. 691; 32 L.Fd. 566.

Government corners are of very little importance in regard
to private boundaries with which this thesis deals.

The writer

will devote more time to other essential pointe called for by
the subject. .

VII.

Courses and Distances.
The general rule of the all powerful intent of the parties

applies more strongly in the case of courses and distances than

in other branches of this subject.

If the intent of the parties,

however, cannot be ascertained, courses are run as they are called

for by the deed.
Four classes of lines are involved in courses, continuous,

straight, meandering, parallel lines.
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The weight of authority is that a line the beginning of
which ie established will run and continue in the same direc
tion, provided nothing contrary appears and is proved.

The

presumption also is that a line, the termini of which is given,
is a straight line.

The above would undoubtedly be upheld in

Maine.
Suppose termini of the boundary be on a stream, and the

line of boundary be the stream.

The line would obviously follow

the meander of the stream.
Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Maine 9.

The intention of the parties governs parallel lines.
Disputes often arise in cases in which a corner or course
is lost.

In such cases it is competent to establish such lost

or disputed corner or course by running back, having reversed

the courses and distances, from a proven corner or bound, hav

ing proven the reversed course or distance.
Seidensparger v. Spear, 17 Maine 125; 35 Am. Dec. 23^*

As a general rule distances, provided they are not con
trolled by other calls, are to be strictly applied.

It ie plain

that the line between two points is to be considered as meaning
the shortest line.
It may often be that the distance given is to a monument
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in which case the monument, when proven, would control.

However,

if no terminating monument is named, it is clear that the line

should be run by the exact courses and distances given.
Scammon et al v. Sawyer,

Maine ^29.

No uniform rule has been established by the courts as re
gards measurements on stream and shore.

Each case must be decid

ed according to the intent of the parties, considering all influ
encing circumstances.

VIII.

Conflieting Elements in Description.

A. In General.

As to just which of several elements of a description should
be given more effect, there is no established rule,

it is well

established, however, that all vague and repugnant description
must give place to any clearer description.

Ricker v. Barry, 3^ Maine 116.

The intention of parties has been dealt with in an earlier
part of this thesis.

B. Courses and Distances.

The rule of law is that courses and distances must give place
to boundaries visible and provable on the face of the earth.
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It is immaterial whether the bounds and monuments be natur

al or artificial if they are in existence.

However, it is also

well established that in case of a call of quantity, courses
and distances will control.
Chandler v. Green, 69 Maine 350In selecting which calls shall be supreme it is necessary

that the intention of the parties, if possible, be given effect
to in all cases.

Beal v. Gordon, 55 Maine 482.
Tenney, C. J., in an early case,

in speaking of the con

trolling forces of courses and distances said: "It is not, then,
a case where monuments cannot be found, but where they cannot
be reconciled one with another.

And, if no mode could be found

to ascertain the intention of the parties, as disclosed by mon

uments, it is a case analogous to one, where monuments fail.
such a state of things, courses and distances are to govern."

Hamlinton v. Foster, 45 Maine 32.
C. Prior Description.

H

Maine has no case on this point, but the tendency of our

court, as gathered from its other holdings on boundary law,

would tend to lead one to believe that it would agree with the

weight of authority.

In
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In case two descriptions

of the same property are used

and are equally clear, the rule is that the prior description

should be followed.
D. Marked Lines.
In case there are defined established lines that have been

surveyed, they will be upheld as the real boundary and will not

give place to other less certain matters of description.

To

quote Tenney, J., who said: ”If, however, there be a precise and
perfect description, showing that the parties actually located
the land upon the earth, and another, which is general in its

terms, and they cannot be reconciled with each other, the latter
may yield to the former.”

Herrich v. Hopkins, 23 Maine 217•
The court has further applied this doctrine.

It has held

that lines marked and surveyed would triumph over maps, field

notes, etc.
Stetson v. Adamst 91 Maine 17$.

Courses and distances also give place to marked lines.

Mosher v. Berrys 30 Maine $3*

E.

Natural Objects.

Natural objects, on account of their permanent nature,
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are of course of more value than calls in descriptions.

Nat

ural objects would control in case of conflict with artificial

monuments, maps, plats, and field notes, provided the intention
of the parties was not obviously contrary.

Courses and distances are also over-weighed by natural

objects.

-

This was established by an important case in which there is
a dissenting opinion.

The course and distance was in part,

•thence south eighty-four degrees east one hundred and fiftysix rode to the pond to a stake and stones.”

The stake and

stones were gone, and the pond was found to be more than one

hundred and fifty-six rods from the beginning point.

Here there

was clearly a case where natural objects and courses and.dis

tances were in conflict.

Justices Appleton, Hathaway, May and

Chief Justice Tenney held that the pond being a natural object
would govern.

Justice Goodenow, dissented; but his reasoning

was placed on other grounds.

F. Artificial Objects.

Artificial objects have the same controlling power over

maps, calls of adjoiners and courses and distances as natural

objects.

The above has only one qualification, the artificial

monument must be plainly capable of identification.

Esmond v. Tarbox, 7 Maine 6; 20 Am. Dec. J^6.
Whitcomb v. Dutton, 89 Maine 212.

Tyles v. Fickett, 7? Maine ^10.

17

G. Metes and. Bounds.

Metes and bounds from which actual boundaries may be ascer
tained invariably control courses, distances and quantity.

Chandler v. McCard, 38 Maine 56^ •
As stated previously, course and distances give place to

other forms of description, and it may be said are of the least
value.
H. Maps and Calle for Adjoiners,

Maps, plats and field notes are next in value.

In general

they control calls for adjoiners, metes and bounds, and courses

and distances.

Haynes v. Young, 36 Maine 557«
Heaton v. Hodges, 1^ Maine 66; 30 Am. Dec.731*

Calls for adjoiners are controlling over courses and dis

tances and metes and bounds, also over quantity.

Bryant v. M. C. R. R. Co., 79 Maine 312.
j'

IX.

Particular Boundaries.

There are certain well defined classes of boundaries. The

most important of these are buildings, highways, and waters.

A. Buildings.
The use of a building as a designation of a division line

is not a common one.

But in case a building is used as such the

question of whether the wall of the building

the line of

its eaves, projections or cornices, would mark the line, is im -

portant.

A distinction is made by the Maine court between the

boundary line of a highway and that between adjoining land owners.
If the building marks the line of the highway the wall

would be the line.

The reason is obvious,

The adjacent owner

is entitled to the use of the air over a highway and to the use
of the earth under it, as long as he does not interfere with

the use of the highway by the public.

It is reasonable there

fore that the cornices would overhang the highway and the wall

itself mark the boundary.

Not so in regard to adjoining owners.

Walton, -J, said: "When land is bounded by a building, it

would be unreasonable to assume that the parties to the convey
ance intended that the main portion of the building should be on
one side of the line, and the cornices, and other projecting fin

ish, on the other.

Hence the rule that in such cases the line

shall be regarded as wholly on one side of every portion of the
building.M
The above is a dictum from Farnsworth v. City of Rockland,

$3 Maine 50^.

The case involved the boundary of a highway and

held as stated in a preceding paragraph.
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B. Hi ghways.
The use of a highway as a boundary is perhaps, the most com

mon of the particular boundaries.
In using the term highway the intention is, on the part of

the writer, to include only open and used roads.

Such is the use

of the term in the decisions of courts of law.

The most common way is to bound by a certain road or highway.
Plainly this would include the land to the centre of the highway.

Webber v. Overlock, 66 Maine 77•
The following early case in Maine forms the basis for our

holdings in regard to this point.
The grant read, in part,this: "Beginning on the westerly
side of the county road, etc., etc."

Held that this carried

title to the centre of the highway.

Johnbon v. Anderson> 18 Maine 7&«

A closer case arose when a stake and stones was located on
the side of the highway.

The calls in the deed were, "On the

east by" a certain road and the last call to the southerly poet

in a pair of bare, on said road."

Even the naming of a stake was

not sufficient to limit the boundary to the side of the road.

Cottle v. Young, 59 Maine 105.
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In a similar case the course was "running by said road to

a stake."

Barrow, J., said; "The mere mention in the descrip

tion of a fixed point on the side of the road as the place of
beginning or ending of one or more of the lot lines, does not
seem to be of itself sufficient .to prevent the passing of the
title to the middle of the highway."
Low v. Tibbetts, 72 Maine 92.

Cottle v. Young,

59 Maine 105.

We have seen it is well settled that, unless expressly
excluded, title passes to the centre of the road, provided gran
tor had title thus far.

Hunt v. Rich,

Maine, 195 •

The actually traveled road bed often varies from the re

corded location.

would govern.

It is therefore necessary to determine which

Maine settled this point in the case of Brooks v.

Morrill, infras

The deed bounded the lot on the east "On the west line of

said road."

The issue in the case was whether the actual

traveled road or the road as recorded should be considered as
the boundary.

The traveled road was held to be the boundary.

In discussing the case, Whitehouse, J., said: "A road is a way

actually used in passing from one place to another.

A mere

survey or location of a route for a road is not a road. A mere

location for a road falls short of a road as much as a house

21

lot falls short of a house.

Brooks v. Morrill, 32 Maine 172.
The laying out of a new road, to replace an old one has not

the least effect on the boundary lines.

Chadwick v. McCausland, ^7 Maine,

The highway must be a public highway and used as such. A
street charted

and indicated on the face of the earth is not

sufficient if it has not become a public street.
A lot was sold and bounded on a street, "as laid down on

said plan.”

The street was not opened until after the grant.

It was not a highway at the time of conveyancing.

was not bound to accept the street.
of the prospective street.

The public

The boundary was the side

The grantee had only an

easement

in the prospective street until its opening, but did not own

the land to its centre.
Bangor House v. Brown, 33 Maine 3°9«

This question of highways as boundaries can be’ summed up
no better than by quoting Chief Justice Appleton:

"It is un

doubtedly true,” he said, "that where land is sold bounded by,

upon, or along a highway, the thread or centre line of the same
is to be presumed to be the limit and boundary of such land.
But it is equally true that the grantor, by apt and fitting

words, may exclude the presumption and reserve the entire road
to himself subject to the easement of the public.

He may bound
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his grantee by the line of the road, and not by the road itself.

Cottle v. Young, supra.
Again, Chief Justice Appleton lays down the same principle

by quoting Shaw, C. J. in Newhall v. Ireson, g Cushing 595.

wLand no doubt may be bounded by the side of the highway but it
must be done in clear and distinct terms to control the ordinary
presumption.”
Before leaving the topic of highways I want to add that by

statute in Maine our legislature has provided for the preserva
tion of boundaries of highways.

This only has to do with the

extent of the easement so to speak and over what portion of the
highway the easement exists.
Maine Revised Statutes of 1903,

Chap. 23, Sec. 11.
r

C• Waters.
Next to highways the most important particular boundary

is waters.
In discussing waters I shall sub-divide the subject into,

non-navigable waters, ponds and lakes, tidal waters and sea

snore.

Non-navigable streams, being the most common, will re

ceive first attention.

(a) Non-navigable Streams.

Under ordinary circumstances it is the almost universal
rule that a grant of land bounded on a non-navigable stream goes

to the thread of the stream.

This was first ruled upon in Maine in the case of Morri
son v. Keen, 3 Maine 472; and the opinion cited as authority was
King v. King, 7 Mass. 49&.

When the meaning, however, is to exclude the flats as in

the case in which the deed read, "thence east until it strikes
the creek on which the mill stands, thence south-westerly on
the west bank of said creek,"

Rice, J., in his opinion says,

"to hold that a party may not bound a grant by the bank, mar

gin, side, or shore of a stream of water, or by the side of a

way, wall, ditch, or other similar object, would, involve an
absurdity.

In all cases where the language used clearly shows

that to be the intention of the grantor, the bank, side, margin,
or shore, become themselves monuments, and are to be treated as

such."

Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Maine 9.

The public has an easement to pass to and fro on even
non-navigable streams and the holding of the land under the

water by the ripirian owner is subject to such easement.
It is clear that a grant to, by, or on the stream

car

ries title to fi1urn mediurn aquae, while express words may limit

it to the bank.
The writer knows of no case in Maine which settles just

what is the thread, of the stream, but finds that the weight of

authority is that the thread of the stream is midway between the

banks when the water is at its natural level and neither at

high nor low water mark.

The main channels or currents are not

important and have no bearing on the determination of what is
the thread of the stream.
pratt v. Lamson, 2 Allen (Mass.) 275*

Kimball v. Schoff, 40 N. H. 191.
The weight of authority in regard to side lines on non-navigable streams is that they extend from the termini of the line
on the bank at right angles with the thread of the stream.

pee rf i_e Id v . A rms, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 41.

(b)

Ponds and Lakes.

If the pond or lake be not what is termed a great pond, that

is, being in extent more than ten acres,then the

owners own to the middle of the lake or pond.

littoral

This is the same

as in the case of ajnon-navi gable stream.

In the case of great ponds the littoral owner takes to low

water mark.

However this may be changed and they may be limited

to high water mark by express words.
Wood v. Kelley, 30 Maine 47.
Bradley v. Rice, 13 Maine 19$.

25

Artificial ponds and lakes have the same standing as natural

ponds and lakes.
(c) Tidal and navigable Waters and Sea-shore.
In considering this division of my subject it is first

necessary to define tidal and navigable waters, and to distinguish

between them if any distinction exists.
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines tidal waters thus: "All
arms of the sea, bays, creeks, coves, or rivers, in which the

tide ebbs and flows, are properly denominated tide-waters.”

It would seem that our court from its previous decisions

would hold that tidal and navigable waters are analogous, and
that on waters that are navigable in fact but not tidal, the
boundary line of the adjoining owner would go to the thread of

the stream.

Granger v. Avery, 64 Maine 292.
Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Maine

9«

8. C. 50 Am. Dec. 641.

Storer y. Freeman, (6 Mass. 435)
Spring v. Russell, 7 Maine 273*

But to return to tidal waters.

Our law on this point orig

inated in the Colonial Ordinance of 1641 of Massachusetts.

To

use the words of Chief Justice Parsons, Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass.

435* this ordinance provided, ’’that the proprietor of land ad

joining on the sea or salt water, shall hold to low water mark,
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where the tide does not ebb more than one hundred rods, but not

more where the tide ebbs to a greater distance.11
This ordinance had the effect of changing the English law,

and it is law in Massachusetts and Maine today.

Since, at the

time of its adoption, Maine was part of Massachusetts.
Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Maine 441.

Therefore, unless words are used such as by the bank, shore
or highwater mark, the boundary of land bordering on tidal waters

and the sea is at low water mark unless the tide ebbs more than
one hundred rode.
Lapisli v. Bank, S Maine £5 •

Stone v. Augusta, 46 Maine 127.

The term shore needs some discussion, as used in legal phras
eology, it meant the flats between high and low water marks.

it is obvious that a

Thus

grant to the shore and by the shore would

extend only to high water mark,
Dunton v. Parker, 97 Maine 461.

A late Maine case was settled in 1905 that involved this
whole law of boundaries on navigable tidal waters and sea-shore.

This case elaborately discussed the different terms of exclussion.

I q uote Justice Savage thus: "But it must be remembered
that the effect of the Colonial Ordinance upon the construction

of deeds is merely to fix boundaries. A deed of the upland prima
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facie conveys flats,- net appurtenances nor privileges merely,
out the land itself, subject to public uses,- to low water mark.
On the other hand, we think it must be held that if, by descrip

tive terms in the deed, the flats are excluded , they do not

pass even as appurtenances or privileges.

They are outside the

boundaries fixed by the deed."

Thus we find that unless limited by words of exclusion
the boundary line is the low water mark and the flats

or shore

pass if owned by the grantor.

Side line on flats are lines at right angles with the

line joining the termini of the lines at the edge of the shore,

and in case the portions of two owners overlap the same is di

vided between them.
Colonial Ordinance 1640.

Ware v. Ware, 9 Maine 42.
In conclusion I wish to lay great stress on the controll

ing, all-powerful effect of intention on the determining and

establishing of boundaries.
It might be said that intention is the key to the law of
boundaries.

Therefore intention is first to be considered be

fore giving effect
by law.

to other elements in their established places

Instruments creating boundaries are to be construed

so as to reflect the intention of the parties.
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It has been the purpose of the writer to consider the prin

ciple, governing phases of the law of boundaries.

To this end

there are embodied in this thesis the leading cases in Maine

on the several points.

It was not proposed to embody all cases

decided in our reports involving boundary law, but only cases

illustrating the governing points, and from which the conclu

sion of minor points must be obvious, have been used.
A few cases out-side our State have been cited and in like
cases the writer believes that our court would follow the de

cisions of the states thus cited.

